In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online by Rappaport, Kim L.
American University International Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 3 Article 5
1998
In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued
Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies
with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech
Online
Kim L. Rappaport
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rappaport, Kim L. "In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitutional Democracies with Internet
Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online." American University International Law Review 13, no. 3 (1998): 765-814.
TPJHUE 'IM OR GAP 'TREATY AS A MODEL




I. The International Law Standard ............................. 730
A. Judicial Decisions ....................................... 730
B. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea .. 733
II. The Spratly Islands ......................................... 734
A. Background and History of the Dispute ................. 734
B. Claimant Countries ..................................... 737
1. China ............................................... 737
2. Taiw an .............................................. 739
3. V ietnam ............................................ 740
4. The Philippines ..................................... 742
5. M alaysia ............................................ 744
6. B runei .............................................. 746
C. Evaluation of Claims .................................... 747
III. The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development ... 750
A. Background and History of the Timor Gap Dispute ...... 750
B. The Timor Gap Treaty .................................. 753
1. Major Provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty ........... 755
C. Effects of the Timor Gap Treaty ......................... 756
D. Applicability to the Spratly Islands Dispute ............. 758
IV. Recommendations .......................................... 760
Conclusion ..................................................... 764
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, American University, Washington College of Law;
B.A., English, 1994, University of Hawaii. The author would like to thank her
family, friends, and especially Mike, for their support, encouragement, and
patience. This Comment is dedicated to my grandfather, the late Paul S. Mito.
727
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
INTRODUCTION
The Spratly Islands,' a collection of small, desolate and
uninhabited islands, reefs, and rocks in the South China Sea, became
the center of attention for several Asian countries in the early 1970s
when preliminary explorations indicated that these islands may lay
atop huge untapped oil and natural gas reserves.2 Six countries: The
People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei currently claim territorial sovereignty over the
Spratly Islands.3 The dispute over their ownership remains
unresolved.
The claimant countries assert legal and historical arguments in
support of their claims and have taken various steps to occupy the
Spratly Islands.' Meanwhile, despite the claimant countries'
expressed commitment to cooperation, diplomacy, and the
employment of peaceful means to settle the dispute,5 tensions remain
high and the potential for armed conflict exists.6 The international
1. See Brian K. Murphy, Comment, Dangerous Ground: The Spratly Islands
and International Law, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 187, 188 (1995) (stating that the
Spratly Islands are also known as the Nansha Islands in China, the Truong Sa
archipelago in Vietnam, and Kalayaan or "Freedomland" in the Philippines).
2. See Hungdah Chiu & Choon-Ho Park, Legal Status of the Paracel and
Spratly Islands, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 1, 4 (1975) (discussing the largest
Philippine oil exploration conducted in September 1973 off of Palawan, just east
of the Spratly Islands); Murphy, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that in 1973 Russian
seismologists discovered signs of oil west of the Spratlys). Explorations revealed
that the Spratly Islands were practically surrounded by oil-producing areas. See id.
3. See, e.g., Michael Bennett, The People's Republic of China and the Use of
International Law in the Spratly Islands Dispute, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 425, 425
(1992) (setting forth the countries claiming sovereignty over the Spratly Islands).
4. See generally MARK J. VALENCIA ET AL., SHARING THE RESOURCES OF THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA 20-38 (1997) (describing the basis of each country's claim).
5. See Chinese General Urges Joint Development of Isles, PERISCOPE-DAILY
DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, May 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7599379 (stating that
China opposes the use or threat of force in settling the Spratly dispute); Singapore
& Thailand Concerned Over Spratlys Dispute, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 30,
1997, available in 1997 WL 2105861 (commenting on China's assurance that
military force would not be utilized to settle the dispute); Ma. Christina V.
Deocadiz, Why all the Fuss About this Islands Chain?, BUs. WORLD (MANILA),
Feb. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7200297 (explaining the Philippines' desire
to use diplomacy in settling the dispute).
6. See P. Paramaswaran, Concerns over Spratlys, Malacca Straits Dog Asian
Naval Show, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, May 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2104886
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community cautiously monitors this potential flash point7 because
armed conflict could have tremendous consequences, not only for
neighboring countries, but for the entire world.8 The situation in the
South China Sea is unstable and tenuous at best.9 The claimant
countries have made little progress toward a compromise,"0 despite
(stating that analysts perceive the Spratly Islands dispute as one of the most
probable sites of armed conflict, other than the Korean Peninsula); Australia Sees
Spratlys as Major Security Threat, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Nov. 22, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (expressing Australian Defence
Minister Robert Ray's belief that other than the Korean peninsula, the Spratly
Island dispute represents the most threatening security risk in the region); Richard
Lloyd Parry, No Plain Sailing in Desert Island Dispute, INDEP. (LONDON), May
20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10468034 (expressing the Philippines' military
chief General Arnulfo Acedera's acknowledgment of the possibility of armed
conflict over the Spratly Islands). But see, e.g., China Said Unlikely to go to War
over Spratlys, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Nov. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File (stating that engaging in armed conflict would be
economically disastrous for China).
7. See Japan Expresses 'Grave Concern' Over Chinese Vessels in Spratlys,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WIL 2105852 (stating that
Japan is closely watching the Spratly Islands situation since it affects regional
security and stability); Singapore & Thailand Concerned Over Spratlys Dispute,
supra note 5 (expressing Singapore and Thailand's concern that tensions over the
Spratly Islands will lead to decreased stability and strained relations in the region);
Thai Navy Fears Spratlys Dispute May Close Sea Lanes, SING. STRAITS TiMES,
July 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12137474 (discussing the Thai navy's concern
that armed conflict in the Spratlys could close vital shipping and communication
lanes). The potentially explosive Spratly Islands dispute has influenced the Thai
navy's attempts to add two more submarines to its fleet. See id But see U.S. Won't
Station Warships Near Spratlys, ASIA PULSE, July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL
16345998 (noting that the United States is closely monitoring the situation, but
does not expect armed conflict to erupt). U.S. commander-in-chief of Pacific
Forces, Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, stated that the United States believes that the
Spratly Island dispute can be settled through negotiations. See id
8. See Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing the strategic importance
of the Spratly Islands and the surrounding South China Sea); Asian Countries
Beef-up Naval Fleets, THE FILIPINO EXPRESS, Mar. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL
15673215 (quoting a Japanese military analyst stating "[w~hoever controls the
Spratlys will gain regional hegemony in the next century").
9. See MARK J. VALENCIA, CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 55
(Adelphi Paper No. 298, 1995) (describing the current situation as a "leaking status
quo" or an unstable "do nothing approach").
10. See id at 54-55 (acknowledging that fundamental issues in the Spratly
Islands dispute remain unresolved). While the claimant countries are engaged in
talks, the talks remain informal and have failed to discuss key issues, such as each
country's sovereignty claim and the basis for such claims. See id
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the fact that some, including China, have expressed a willingness to
shelve the sovereignty dispute and proceed with joint efforts to
develop the natural resources of the Spratly Islands."
This Comment suggests that a joint development regime, similar
to the one employed by Australia and Indonesia to settle the Timor
Gap dispute, 12 presents a possible solution to the Spratly Islands
conflict. Part I briefly examines the applicable international law
standards and principles. Part II describes the history of the Spratly
Islands dispute and briefly analyzes each country's claim. Part III
discusses the background and history of the Timor Gap dispute and
explores the major provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty. Finally, Part
IV recommends that the countries implement more confidence
building measures and establish a three-tiered joint development
agreement, consisting of twelve separate joint development zones.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD
A. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The Island of Palmas case,13 decided by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in 1928, set forth the factors necessary to establish
11. See China Establishes Scientific Expeditions, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF.
NEWS CAPSULES, Mar. 26, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7597843 (expressing
China's commitment to shelving its differences with the other claimant countries
and proceeding with joint exploration of the natural resources of the territory);
Chinese General Urges Joint Development of Isles, supra note 5 (stating Lt.
General Xiong Guangkai's suggestion that the claimant countries put aside their
differences and jointly develop the area); Qian on China Stand Over Nansha
Islands, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Worldwide
Library, Xinhua File (quoting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen as stating,
"the [Spratly] disputes should be shelved and efforts should be made for joint
development").
12. See infra notes 178-94 and accompanying text (detailing the major
provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty, which provide for the creation of a joint
development zone).
13. Arbitral Award Rendered in Conformity with the Special Agreement
Concluded on January 23, 1925 Between the Unites States of America and the
Netherlands Relating to the Arbitration of Differences Respecting Sovereignty
Over The Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928) [hereinafter Palmas case].
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territorial sovereignty over an island.'" The Palmas case concerned
the conflicting sovereignty claims of the United States and the
Netherlands over an isolated, but inhabited island located between
the Philippines and the former Dutch East Indies. 5 The United States
claimed that Spain originally discovered Palmas Island and
subsequently ceded title to the United States under the Treaty of
Paris. ,'6 The United States also based its claim on the island's
contiguity to the Philippines." The Netherlands, on the other hand,
claimed sovereignty based on their peaceful and continuous display
of state authority over the island. 8 The Arbitrator 9 awarded Palmas
Island to the Netherlands and held that the mere act of discovering an
island results only in inchoate title" and does not suffice to establish
sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by a continuous and
peaceful display of authority or some degree of effective
occupation."'
In contrast, the Permanent Court of Arbitration held in the
Clipperton Island caseP that France's discovery and declaration of
14. See id at 838 (stating that sovereignty involves "the exclusive right to
display the activities of a state" and the "continuous and peaceful display of the
functions of state within a given region").
15. See id at 834 (noting that Palmas Island, also known as Miangas, is an
isolated island located "half way between Cape San Augustin... and the most
northerly island of the Nanusa (Nanoesa) group"). The island was inhabited by
native peoples. See id at 870.
16. See id at 835-36 (noting that the United States claimed that Palmas Island
was part of the Philippine archipelago, which Spain ceded to the United States
under the Treaty of Paris). The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10, 1898.
See id at 834. Cession transferred all of Spain's sovereignty rights in the specified
region, which included Palmas Island. See id at 841.
17. See id at 836 (indicating the United States belief that sovereign control of
the Philippines granted the United States sovereignty over the contiguous Palmas
Island).
18. See Palmas case, supra note 13, at 857 (stating that the Netherlands had
displayed sovereignty for the preceding two centuries).
19. See id at 832 (stating that the parties asked Max Huber of Switzerland to
serve as the sole arbitrator).
20. See id at 829 (defining "inchoate title" as "a claim to establish sovereignty
by effective occupation"). Inchoate title must be completed by effective
occupation within a reasonable time. See id at 846.
21. See id at 872.
22. Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the
Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island (Fr. v. Mex.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1931), reprinted in 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932) [hereinafter Clipperton case].
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sovereignty in a Honolulu journal were sufficient to establish
sovereignty over an uninhabited atoll.23 The Arbitrator 4 concluded
that in some instances, where the territory claimed is completely
uninhabited, the requirement of effective occupation may be
unnecessary.25 The Clipperton case involved the sovereignty claims
of France and Mexico over an uninhabited atoll located off the coast
of Mexico.26 France asserted that a French Lieutenant claimed the
island on behalf of the French government in 1858,27 while Mexico
claimed ownership by way of cession from Spain.2" The Arbitrator
awarded Clipperton Island to France, despite the absence of any
"positive and apparent act of sovereignty" on the part of France.29
The Clipperton Island case appears germane to an analysis of the
Spratly Islands dispute because the Spratly Islands are similarly
isolated and uninhabited."0 Higher standards for effective control may
be applied in the Spratly Islands dispute due to the number of
23. See id. at 1109 (concluding that France legitimately acquired Clipperton
Island when a French Naval Lieutenant declared sovereignty over the island on
behalf of the French government on November 17, 1858).
24. See id. at 1105 (noting that Victor Emmanuel III served as the arbitrator in
the matter).
25. See id at 1109 (holding that if a completely uninhabited territory is "at the
absolute and undisputed disposition" of a state, occupation is completed "from the
first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there").
26. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 (stating that Clipperton lies 600
miles south of Mexico).
27. See Clipperton case, supra note 22, at 1106 (noting that the French were
successful in landing several crew members on the island, but left no evidence of
their sovereignty claim). After receiving official notification, the French Consulate
in Hawaii published France's declaration of sovereignty over Clipperton Island in
a Honolulu journal. See id.
28. See id at 1107 (describing Mexico's claim to Clipperton). Mexico asserted
that the Spanish Navy discovered the island and that Mexico succeeded the
Spanish state in 1836. See id.
29. Id. at 1106. In awarding the island to France, the Arbitrator stated that
Spain's discovery of the island had not been proven and that Mexico had not
manifested its sovereign right over the island. See id. at 1106-07.
30. See Dr. Barry Hart Dubner, The Spratly "Rocks" Dispute-A
"Rockapelago" Defies Norms of International Law, 9 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J.
291, 295 (1995) (noting that the Spratly Islands are too small to sustain permanent
inhabitants); Bennett, supra note 3, at 429, 430 (stating many of the islands are
completely underwater or covered mainly by bushes, guano, and a few coconut
and plantain trees).
732 [13:727
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DIsPuTE
claimant countries involved and the complexity of their claims.3
Moreover, the International Court of Justice held that when an
ambiguity exists, actual displays of authority, evidence of
possession,32 and acquiescence by other states to the exercise of
sovereignty are of decisive importance in determining sovereignty
issues.3
B. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA
Although the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea ("UNCLOS") 3' embodies customary international law and
governs practically every aspect of ocean management,35 it is of little
impact in the Spratly Islands dispute since it fails to provide specific
31. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 436.
32. See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr. v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47 (Nov. 17)
(involving the sovereignty claims of France and the United Kingdom over a group
of islets and rocks located between the coast of France and the Island of Jersey).
The two countries produced treaties and other historical documents in an attempt
to prove that they possessed ancient or original title. See id at 53. In this particular
case, the International Court of Justice found it unnecessary to resolve the
"historical controversies." See id at 56. What was of decisive importance to the
court was "evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Minquiers and
Ecrehos groups" and not "indirect presumptions deduced from events in the
Middle Ages." Id at 57.
33. See Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El
Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar. intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351 (Sept. 11) (concerning islands
located in the Gulf of Fonseca, which had once been under the sovereign control
of Spain). In 1839, upon the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Central
America, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua emerged as separate States and
asserted conflicting sovereignty claims over the islands. See id. at 381. In awarding
the island of El Tigre to Honduras and Meanguera and Meanguerita Islands to El
Salvador, the Court relied upon evidence of possession, control, displays of
sovereignty, and the lack of protest by the other countries. See id. at 579.
34. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 621122, (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. UNCLOS entered into force on Nov. 16, 1994. See id;
China Ratifies U.N. Sea Law Treaty, ASIAN POL. NEWS, May 20, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 7591726 (announcing that China ratified UNCLOS on May 15,
1996).
35. See R. R. CHURCHILL& A. V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 15-17 (1988);
see also Mark J. Valencia, Troubled Waters: Oil is Only One Reason for Asia's
Many-Sided Disputes Over Tiny, Uninhabitable Islands, BULL. ATOM. SciENmSTs,
Jan. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9508983 (stating that UNCLOS "embodies
most international law and state practice relating to the oceans").
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guidelines for delimiting maritime boundaries.36 The only guidance
UNCLOS provides is that boundary disputes involving the
continental shelf or exclusive economic zone ("EEZ") shall be
resolved "by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred
to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution."37
1I. THE SPRATLY ISLANDS
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
Over one hundred tiny islands, rocks, coral reefs, and atolls 3 make
up the Spratly Islands, which are located in the southern portion of
the South China Sea, roughly between Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia,
and the Philippines,39 and approximately 500 miles south of China.4"
The islands are scattered over an area in excess of 180,000 square
36. See Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary
Delimitation Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1994) (stating that international
maritime boundary law, as codified in UNCLOS is indeterminate); see also
Charles Liu, Comment, Chinese Sovereignty and Joint Development: A Pragmatic
Solution to the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 865, 876
(1996) (noting that UNCLOS provides little guidance in determining the
sovereignty of islands); KRIANGSAK KITICHAISAREE, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND
MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN SouTH-EAST AsIA 140 (1987) (stating
that UNCLOS does not cover territorial disputes).
37. UNCLOS, supra note 34, art. 83, 21 I.L.M. at 1286; see Liu, supra note
36, at 875 n.68 (noting that article 83 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides that "disputes shall be decided in accordance with international
law"). International law includes international conventions and custom, general
principles of law, and judicial decisions. See id
38. See Dubner, supra note 30, at 292 (providing several different descriptions
of the Spratly Islands and features). The descriptions of the sizes, number, and
location of the Spratly Islands vary depending on the source of the information.
See id; see also VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 227-34 (providing descriptions
and locations of Spratly features that are occupied and/or rise above water at low
tide).
39. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 36, at 868 (providing a general description of the
physical location of the Spratly Islands).
40. See Bennett supra note 3, at 429 (stating that the distance between the
Spratly Islands and the Chinese mainland is more than 500 miles). But see Lee G.
Cordner, The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, 25 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 61 (1994) (stating that the Spratlys are approximately 900 miles south of
China's Hainan Island).
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kilometers4' and many features are entirely submerged. -
Prior to oil explorations in the 1970s, the Spratly Islands were
largely overlooked.43 The only natural resources the islands were
thought to possess were guano, phosphate deposits, and abundant
fish stocks.' At that time, the Spratlys were probably known best as
a navigational hazard. 5 Mariners were careful to steer clear of the
island group designated as "Dangerous Ground" on their maps and
charts.
46
These "tiny specks of rock,' 4 7 however, emerged as some of the
most sought after property in Asia after major oil discoveries were
made in the area surrounding the islands." In addition to the potential
hydrocarbon wealth of the surrounding seabed,49 the Spratly Islands
41. See KrIcHAISAREE, supra note 36, at 141 (estimating the size of the
Spratly Island group).
42. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 429 (stating that many of the Spratly Islands
are underwater). The islands that do rise above sea level are too small to support
any permanent inhabitants. See id at 430. Itu Aba, also known as Taiping Island,
is the largest island in the Spratly group and spans a mere 400 square meters. See
Murphy, supra note 1, at 187.
43. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that the Spratly Islands were
ignored by the world until the second half of this century).
44. See id at 188 (describing the natural resources of the Spratly Islands). The
Spratly Islands and surrounding waters contain guano and phosphate deposits, sea
shells, turtles, and fish. See id
45. See id (speculating that the islands were best known by mariners because
of their treacherous territory).
46. See Parry, supra note 6 (remarking that the Royal Navy carrier, HMS
Illustrious, will be sure to avoid the "Dangerous Ground" of the Spratly Islands
while conducting exercises in Asia); Cordner, supra note 40, at 61 (stating that the
Spratly Islands are labeled as "Dangerous Ground" on navigation charts); Murphy,
supra note 1, at 188 (stating that mariners avoided the Spratly Islands which were
marked as "dangerous ground" on charts); Richard D. Belier, Note, Analyzing the
Relationship Between International Law and International Politics in China's and
Vietnam's Territorial Dispute Over the Spratly Islands, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293,
295 (1994) (citing the Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, which notes
that the Spratly Islands are a "serious navigational hazard").
47. Parry, supra note 6.
48. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting several explorations that
revealed the oil-producing potential of the Spratly region).
49. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 61 (stating that results of a 1969 United
Nations report indicate the possibility of rich hydrocarbon deposits in the region);
Murphy, supra note 1, at 188 (stating that the international oil industry describes
the Spratly Island petroleum deposit as an "elephant" with the potential to produce
over a billion barrels of oil). But see Liu, supra note 36, at 869 (stating that oil
1998]
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are also attractive because of their strategic location." Situated in the
middle of the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands straddle major
international shipping and communication routes5 and connect the
South China Sea with the Indian Ocean, East China Sea, and Pacific
Ocean.52
Under UNCLOS, a state exercising territorial sovereignty over an
island may declare a territorial sea 3 extending 12 nautical miles from
the island's baseline. 4 The sovereignty of the controlling state
extends to the air space above and the seabed and subsoil below the
territorial sea." In addition, a state exercising territorial sovereignty
over an island may declare an EEZ,56 which extends 200 nautical
deposits in the Spratly Islands are speculative); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at
9-10 (noting that some argue that the Spratly's oil potential is "modest" due to the
deep water in the region); Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that oil
exploitation is either "technologically impossible or commercially unprofitable"
due to the water depth in the Spratly area).
50. See Belier, supra note 46, at 296 (noting the strategic value of the Spratly
Islands). Some analysts assert that the strategic value of the Spratlys outweighs the
value of the region's natural resources. See id.
51. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 61 (stating that the Malacca, Lombok, and
Sunda Straits, which are vital lines of communication linking the Indian and
Pacific Ocean, are proximate to the Spratly Islands); Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at
5-6 (noting that the sea lane between the Spratly and Paracel Islands is a major
route for the navies of the United States and Soviet Union, oil tankers, and
merchant marine vessels); Parry, supra note 6 (noting that each year,
approximately 15 percent of the world's shipping and 70 percent of the oil
imported by Japan, Korea, China, and Taiwan passes through the South China
Sea); Deocadiz, Why all the Fuss About this Islands Chain?, supra note 5 (stating
that 90 percent of Japan's petroleum imports pass through the region).
52. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 431-32 (stating that the sea surrounding the
Spratly Islands connects with the Indian Ocean and also connects the East China
Sea with the Sea of Japan). The South China Sea also constitutes part of the
shortest route between East Asia and Southeast Asia, Africa, Europe, and the
Middle East. See id,
53. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, pt. VIII, art. 121.
54. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, pt. II, § 1, arts. 2-3. UNCLOS provides that
the baseline, for purposes of "measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the
low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal State." Id pt. II, § 1, art. 5.
55. See Dubner, supra note 30, at 296 (providing that a coastal state "has the
utmost jurisdiction" over its land, the territory within its baseline, and the territory
within its territorial sea).
56. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, pt. VIII, art. 121.
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miles from the island's baseline. Within the EEZ, the controlling
state has sovereign rights over the natural resources located in the
water, sea-bed, and subsoil.5 8 Both of these provisions, coupled with
the strategic location and potential oil wealth of the region,
underscore the value and importance of the Spratly Islands and
undoubtedly motivate the claimant countries' desire to exercise
sovereignty over the islands.59
B. CLAIMANT COUNTRIES
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
each assert overlapping claims of territorial sovereignty over all or
part of the Spratly Islands.60 Each of the claimant countries assert a
variety of arguments in support of their claims, ranging from
historical evidence of discovery and occupation to arguments based
on international law principles and UNCLOS provisions.6
1. China
Based upon historical evidence that the Chinese discovered and
used the islands "since ancient times,"'62 China claims sovereignty
over the entire Spratly chain and the surrounding South China Sea.6
In support of this claim, the Chinese point to descriptions of the
islands in Chinese history books, maps, navigational records, and
surveys as evidence that they discovered, occupied, and used the
57. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, pt. V, art. 56-57. The EEZ "shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured." Id art. 57.
58. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, pt. U, art. 56(l)(a). The coastal State also has
jurisdiction with respect to establishing and using artificial structures, scientific
marine research, and marine environment protection systems. See id art. 56(l)(b).
59. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 431 (stating that China's sovereignty claim is
motivated by the Spratly Island's strategic location and natural resource wealth);
Cordner, supra note 40, at 61 (commenting that sovereign control over the
Spratlys, along with the ability to declare territorial seas and EEZs, would yield a
"commanding position").
60. See, e.g., Cordner, supra note 40, at 62.
61. See generally VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 20-38 (evaluating the
strength of each countries' claims).
62. Cordner, supra note 40, at 62.
63. See Deocadiz, Why all the Fuss About this Islands Chain?, supra note 5
(noting that China claims the entire South China Sea and refers to the region as the
"China Lake").
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Spratlys as fishing grounds as early as the second century B.C.64
Additionally, China asserts that a 1887 treaty between France and
China65 further evidences Chinese ownership of the Spratlys, which
lie east of the delimitation line.66
Each of China's claims, however, is weak.67 China relies on
unconvincing evidence, the 1887 treaty with France, to prove its
ownership of the Spratly Islands.6" Although China appears to have
64. See Bennett, supra note 3, at 434 (stating that China claims to have
discovered the Spratly Islands during the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. to A.D. 24));
Cordner, supra note 40, at 62 (stating that Chinese navigators reported specific
transit records in 1292 and between 1403-33). A book published by a Chinese
scholar in 1730 describes the geography of the Spratly Islands. See id. See
generally Teh-Kuang Chang, China's Claim of Sovereignty Over Spratly and
Paracel Islands: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 23 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
399, 403-06 (1991) (citing at least nine Chinese books that describe the geography
of the Spratly Islands and document Chinese voyages to and activities in the
Spratly region); Tao Cheng, The Dispute Over the South China Sea Islands, 10
TEX. INT'L L.J. 265, 273-76 (1975) (discussing ten frequently cited instances that
form the basis of China's claim); Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 9-11 (describing
references to the Spratly Islands in Chinese books and maps).
65. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 62-64. The treaty, dated June 26, 1887, was
entered to delimit territory between China and Vietnam, which was established as
a French protectorate in 1884. See id. France claimed all territory "west of 105
degrees 43 minutes east of Paris... therefore ceding territory east of this line to
China." Id.
66. See Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 11 (citing the Convention Respecting the
Delimination of the Frontier Between China and Tonkin (Vietnam), signed June
26, 1887 that provided France all territory "west of 105 degrees 43 minutes east of
Paris... therefore ceding territory east of this line to China"). Because the Spratly
Islands are located east of the boundary line created by the 1887 treaty, the
Chinese argue that the islands belong to them. See id; see also Murphy, supra note
1, at 191.
67. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 201 (concluding that China's claim,
evaluated under the Palmas Island Arbitration standards, lacks legal strength);
Dubner, supra note 30, at 309 (identifying the Chinese government's failure to
include the Spratly Islands on a 1928 official chart of Chinese territory as one
weakness in China's claim); Bennett, supra note 3, at 449 (concluding that China's
claim lacks merit under international law); see also VALENCIA ET AL., supra note
4, at 23 (pointing out additional weaknesses in China's claim). But see Liu, supra
note 36, at 871 (stating that historical records, as well as modem manifestations of
sovereignty support China's claim); Chang, supra note 64, at 408-13 (explaining
that China has continuously and peacefully occupied the Spratly Islands, as
established by international law). China acquired inchoate title by virtue of its
discovery of the Spratly Islands and has "maintained continuous sovereignty"
since Admiral Cheng Ho's first voyage to the South China Sea in 1405. Id. at 410.
68. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 21 (stating that China's claim, based
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had the earliest recorded contact with the Spratly Islands, 9 China's
historical evidence fails to provide any conclusive proof of routine
occupation and, at most, supports only a claim of inchoate title. 0 In
1988, China began efforts to occupy and station troops on vacant
islands.1 China presently occupies nine Spratly features.'
2. Taiwan
Taiwan's claim to the Spratly Islands is essentially the same as
China's and is based on historical discovery and use of the islands."
upon the 1887 treaty, is weak since the Treaty did not name any islands). France
subsequently argued that the delimitation line only pertained to the northern
portion of the South China Sea. See id; Cordner, supra note 40, at 64 (noting that
both Chinese and French interpretations of the Treaty are controversial). In
addition, the Treaty did not specify any north, south, or eastern limits. See id.
69. See Liu, supra note 36, at 879 (stating that China's documented discovery
of the Spratly Islands 2,000 years ago "predates Vietnam's earliest record of
contact with the islands by over a millennium"); Dubner, supra note 30, at 308
(stating that China may have had the earliest contact with the Spratly Islands,
despite the dispute over the dates of discovery).
70. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 62, 65 (describing China's historical
evidence as sparse, intermittent, and incomplete). Occasional and infrequent visits
by mariners and fishermen do not satisfy the standard of continuous occupation.
See id; Murphy, supra note 1, at 200 (stating that records support China's claim
that it was the first to discover the Spratlys, however, there is no convincing
evidence of a peaceful and continuous display of Chinese authority, as required to
establish sovereignty under the Palmas Island Arbitration); see also Beller, supra
note 46, at 305 (admitting that Chinese history books documenting China's
discovery of the Spratly Islands are a biased source of information).
71. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 201. Vietnam was simultaneously engaged in
efforts to occupy vacant features. See id In March 1988, a clash erupted between
China and Vietnam when China ambushed three Vietnamese supply ships, killing
several Vietnamese sailors. See id at 195.
72. See Ma. Christina V. Deocadiz, The South China Sea Conflict. Exactly
What are the Stakes?, Bus. WORLD (MANILA), July 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11539606; VALENCLA ET AL., supra note 4, at 22 (listing the nine features occupied
by China). China currently occupies Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reet Johnson Reef, Kennan Reef, Loaita Cay, North Danger Reefs, Subi Reef,
and Whitson Reef. See id at 21-22. Some sources indicate that each of the features
China occupies remain submerged at high tide. See id at 22.
73. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 62 (stating that Taiwan's claim begins with
the same historical claim as China's). After Taiwan and China separated in 1947,
Taiwan attempted to advance its own claim to the Spratlys. See id; see also
VALENCA ET AL., supra note 4, at 29 (stating that Taiwan claims to be the
legitimate government of China); Bennett, supra note 3, at 448 (noting that China
incorporates Taiwan's claim into its own because China does not recognize
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In addition, Taiwan claims that after the Japanese invaded Hainan
Island, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands in 1939,"4 the
Japanese placed the Spratly Islands under Taiwan's jurisdiction.75 In
1946, Taiwan attempted to establish a garrison on Itu Aba following
Japan's withdrawal at the end of World War II, but was also forced
to withdraw when China took over Hainan Island in 1950.76 Taiwan
did not occupy the Spratlys again until 1956 when it reestablished a
garrison on Itu Aba."
Taiwan's claim is based upon the same historical evidence as
China's and thus suffers from the same weaknesses, attributable to
unconvincing and intermittent proof.78 Taiwan may, however, have a
strong claim to Itu Aba Island, which it has continuously occupied
since 1956.' 9
3. Vietnam
Based upon historical documents evidencing Vietnamese visits
and administration," both before and after French occupation,
81
Taiwan as a separate state).
74. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 64 (stating that Japan established "the first
recorded permanent garrison and effective sovereign control over the Spratlys").
75. See Dubner, supra note 30, at 310 (noting that Taiwan was, at the time, a
territory of Japan).
76. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 64.
77. See id. (stating that Taiwan has maintained a garrison on Itu Aba since
1956).
78. See id. (providing that Taiwan and China rely on the same ancient
evidence in support of their claims).
79. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 193 (stating that the Taiwanese navy
regularly patrols the island). Taiwan's occupation appears to be the longest
continuous occupation of any Spratly Island since the dispute began. See id; ROC
Construction ofAirstrip Postponed, PERIScOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, Jan.
18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7596130 (stating that Taiwan postponed its plans
to construct an airstrip on Taiping Island). Taiwan also postponed plans to
encourage emigration from Taiwan to the Spratlys due to "sensitive issues"
concerning the Spratlys. Id; see also Taiwan to Delay New Airport on Taiping
Island, AIRPORTS, Jan. 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8111979 (noting that
although it has delayed plans to build an airstrip on Taiping Island, Taiwan will
proceed with plans to promote tourism to the Spratlys).
80. See VALENCIA, ET AL., supra note 4, at 30 (stating that Vietnamese court
documents dating between 1460 and 1497 indicate that the Spratly Islands were
Vietnamese territory). Seventeenth century Vietnamese maps depict the Spratlys as
Vietnamese territory. See id.; Cordner, supra note 40, at 65 (noting that official
documents claim to trace Vietnamese ownership back to 1650). Vietnam has not,
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Vietnam claims ownership to the entire Spratly chain.82 In addition,
Vietnam claims that it succeeded France's claim when Vietnam was
granted independence." Vietnam reaffirmed its sovereignty claim at
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference.'
Vietnam's claim to the Spratly Islands is weak for several reasons.
First, Vietnam's historical claim, like China's, suffers from
evidentiary weaknesses;" second, Vietnam did not succeed France's
1933 claim; 6 third, there are significant lapses in Vietnamese control
however, identified the basis for this claim. See id Vietnam also claims that the
Spratlys were governed from 1816 by Emperor Gia-long. See id.; Deocadiz, The
South China Sea Conflict: Exactly What are the Stakes?, supra note 72 (stating
that Vietnam claims its fisherman have fished in the Spratly region for centuries).
81. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 30. Vietnam was established as a
French protectorate in 1884. See id; Deocadiz, The South China Sea Conflict:
Exactly What are the Stakes?, supra note 72 (stating that France occupied the
Spratly Islands from 1933 to 1939). In 1939, Japan invaded the Spratlys and used
them as a submarine base during World War II. See id
82. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 65; VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 8
(stating that Vietnam, along with China and Taiwan, claims all features that rise
above sea level). See generally Chang, supra note 64, at 416 (outlining five
grounds upon which Vietnam bases its claim).
83. See Belier, supra note 46, at 305 (stating that Vietnam's claim to the
Spratlys is based upon its succession to France's title). Vietnam first asserted that it
succeeded France's claim at the 1951 Peace Conference. See id at 308; see also
Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 8 (citing the Vietnamese delegate to the 1951 Peace
Conference's affirmation of Vietnam's ownership of the Spratlys); Chang, supra
note 64, at 416 (noting that none of the fifty-one powers at the Peace Conference
made any objection to Vietnam's claim); Murphy, supra note 1, at 192 (expressing
surprise that France, a participant in the Conference, did not reassert its
sovereignty claim); Cordner, supra note 40, at 65 (noting that the 1939 Japanese
invasion of the Spratly Islands ended France's sovereignty claim).
84. See Chiu & Park, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that subsequent to World War
II, a fifty-one nation conference was held in San Francisco on September 7, 1951
to sign a peace treaty with Japan); Chang, supra note 64, at 416 (stating that Japan
was forced to relinquish all territory it had seized during the war, including the
Spratly Islands).
85. See VALENCIA Er AL., supra note 4, at 32 (describing Vietnam's evidence
as "sparse, anecdotal, and inconclusive"); Cordner, supra note 40, at 65
(describing an 1838 map depicting the Spratly Islands as Vietnamese territory as
"inaccurate"). But see Archaeology Affirms Sovereignty over Spratlys, PERISCOPE-
DAILY DEF. NEWs CAPsULEs, Apr. 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7598291
(stating that Vietnamese archaeological searches revealed that the Vietnamese had
lived on Truong Sa and Nam Yet continuously since the 14th century).
86. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that France specifically stated in
1933 that it did not cede annexation of the Spratlys to Vietnam); Liu, supra note
36, at 872 (stating that France claims it never ceded the Spratlys to Vietnam);
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over the Spratlys;87 and fourth, statements made by North
Vietnamese government officials in 1956 and 1958 support China's
claim to the Spratlys."8 Despite these weaknesses, however, Vietnam
has maintained garrisons on twenty-two Spratly features since
1973.89
4. The Philippines
The Philippines claims most of the Spratly Islands" based upon
the theory that the islands were terra nullius9' when a Filipino lawyer
and businessman discovered them in 1947.92 The Philippines also
contends that the Spratly Islands were terra nullius following the
Dubner, supra note 30, at 311 (claiming that subsequent to France's occupation in
1933, sovereignty was transferred to Japan in 1941); see also Belier, supra note
46, at 308 (noting that Vietnam failed to take any action following its 1951 claim).
87. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 66 (commenting that "significant gaps"
exist in the history of Vietnam's sovereign control over the Spratly Islands). There
was no Vietnamese activity nor any attempts by Vietnam to occupy the Spratlys
for fifteen years. See id.
88. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 193 (noting that North Vietnam supported
China's sovereignty claim instead of South Vietnam's claim); VALENCIA ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 32-33 (noting that statements made by North Vietnam's Second
Foreign Minister in 1956 and Prime Minister in 1958 recognized and supported
China's sovereignty claim, thereby weakening Vietnam's current position).
89. See Vietnam Installs Radio Equipment on Islands, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF.
NEWS CAPSULES, June 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7599993 (stating that
Vietnam installed radio relay stations and receivers on five islands). This
installation is the first phase of a Vietnamese plan to upgrade radio facilities on the
Spratly Islands and is designed to provide soldiers stationed on the islands with
informative and entertaining broadcasts. See id.
90. See J.R.V. PRESCOTt, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE
WORLD 218 (1985) (noting that the Philippines' claim excludes Spratly Island and
several reefs located in the south); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 33 (stating
that while the Philippines claims most of the Spratly Islands, it does not claim
Spratly Island itself).
91. See ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391 (Clive
Parry et al., eds., 1986) (defining "terra nullius" as a term of art meaning "a
territory belonging to no-one--at the time of the act alleged to constitute the
'occupation').
92. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 66 (describing Tomas Cloma's claimed
discovery of several unoccupied islands). In May 1956, Cloma named the islands
"Kalayaan," or Freedomland, and appointed himself "Chairman of the Supreme
Council of the Kalayaan State." Id, Cloma's claim generated several diplomatic
protests. See id Cloma transferred ownership of Kalayaan to the Philippine
government in 1974. See id.
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1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, therefore, invalidating all previous
claims of ownership and justifying its occupation.93 Lastly, the
Philippines claims that the Spratly Islands lie within its archipelagic
territory9' and are "vital to the country's security and economic
survival." 9 In 1978, the Philippines formally claimed the Spratly
Islands by presidential decree.96
The Philippines arguably possesses the weakest claims to the
Spratly Islands.97 The argument that the islands were unclaimed and
unoccupied when Cloma "discovered" them in 1947 is unconvincing
and highly unlikely.9" In addition, Cloma's discovery did not give
rise to a claim of ownership on the part of the Philippine government
since Cloma was acting in an individual capacity, independent of the
93. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 66 (noting that the Spratly Islands were "de
facto under trusteeship" of the Allied Powers following the 1951 San Francisco
Peace Treaty). In response to an incident in 1971, when a Philippine fishing boat
was fired upon by Taiwan near Itu Aba Island, the Philippines protested and
argued that since China occupied islands, which were trusts of the Allied Powers,
it was forbidden from establishing garrisons on the islands without the consent of
the Allies. See id; VALENCIA Er AL., supra note 4, at 34 (describing the
Philippines' belief that their occupation of the Spratly Islands is justified because
of the islands' status as trusts and the apparent abandonment of the islands by other
countries between 1950 and 1956).
94. See, e.g., Dubner, supra note 30, at 312 (noting that the Philippine
government's protest to Taiwan over the 1971 incident included the argument that
the Spratly Islands are within the archipelagic territory of the Philippines).
95. See PRESCOir, supra note 90, at 222 (noting that the Philippines bases its
sovereignty claim upon "indispensible need"). But see Dubner, supra note 30, at
313 (commenting that the Philippines' justifies its claim on "vague security and
economic grounds").
96. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 34 (stating that Philippine President
Ferdinand Marcos officially declared that Kalayaan was part of the Philippines in
1978). President Marcos made a similar declaration in 1971 in a diplomatic note to
Taipei. See id at 34 & n.147; see also Dubner, supra note 30, at 312 (noting that
the presidential decree does not include Spratly Island); Cordner, supra note 40, at
67 (stating that the decree also included the declaration of a 200 nautical mile
EEZ).
97. See Dubner, supra note 30, at 323 (describing the Philippines' claim, based
on Cloma's discovery, as "worthless").
98. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 207 (describing Cloma's purported discovery
of the islands as lacking credibility). Prior to 1947, the Spratly Islands undoubtedly
had been discovered and explored numerous times. See iet; VALENCIA Er AL.,
supra note 4, at 35 (noting that China, Taiwan, and Vietnam challenge the
Philippines' assertion that the islands were abandoned prior to Cloma's discovery).
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government.99 Moreover, it is unlikely that Cloma's ninety-day
occupation' 0 of the Spratly Islands satisfies the Palmas Island
standard of a continuous display of authority.'' Lastly, the Spratly
Islands are not located within the Philippines' archipelagic territory
since the Palawan Trough separates the islands from the Philippine
archipelago." 2 In spite of these weaknesses, however, the Philippines
has occupied eight features since 1978 and may have a valid claim to
these features under the Palmas Island standard."0 3
5. Malaysia
In 1979, Malaysia claimed twelve features in the southern portion
of the Spratly Islands, which Malaysia contends are located on its
continental shelf.' ° Malaysia asserts that UNCLOS continental shelf
provisions allow a coastal state to exercise sovereignty over islands
99. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 35 (stating that "independent
territorial claims of private individuals are not equivalent to governmental claims
unless the individual is acting on the authority of government or the government
asserts jurisdiction over the individual"); Cordner, supra note 40, at 67 (noting that
international law gives the independent activities of individuals little value).
100. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 207 (noting that Cloma established
settlements on the islands, but abandoned them after only 90 days); Bennett, supra
note 3, at 438 (stating that Cloma abandoned the islands within a few months of
discovering them).
101. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 207 (concluding that although "continuous"
was not defined in the Palmas Island case, it is unlikely that abandonment after 90
days is continuous).
102. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 67 (describing the trough as distinct and
deep); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 35 (concluding that the existence of the
Palawan Trough weakens the Philippines' continental shelf claim).
103. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 34 (stating that since 1978, the
Philippines has occupied eight Spratly features). The features occupied by the
Philippines are Commodore Reef, Flat Island, Lankiam Cay, Loaita Island,
Nanshan Island, Northeast Cay, West York Island, and Thitu Island. See id. at 34-
35. The Philippines has already constructed an airstrip on Thitu Island and has
announced plans to build lighthouses on several other features. See id.
104. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 207 (stating that Malaysia established its
claim in 1979 based on Article 76 of UNCLOS); VALENCIA Er AL., supra note 4,
at 36 (listing the twelve features and islands claimed by Malaysia). Malaysia
occupies Ardasier Reef, Dallas Reef, Louisa Reef, Mariveles Reef, Royal
Charlotte Reef, and Swallow Reef. See id. Malaysia also claims, but does not
occupy Amboyna Cay, Barque Canada Reef, Commodore Reef, Erica Reef,
Investigator Reef, and Luconia Reef. See id.
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located on its continental shelf.'1 5 Malaysia also makes a historical
claim of discovery and occupation of these features based on a
Malaysian map issued in 1979, depicting the southernmost Spratlys
as part of Malaysia's continental shelf.'0 6
Malaysia's claim lacks strength for several reasons. First,
Malaysia's interpretation of UNCLOS is incorrect.' 7  While
UNCLOS does allow a coastal state to control the resources of its
continental shelf,"8 none of the provisions grants sovereign rights to
a coastal state over islands located on its continental shelf.'" Second,
Malaysia's 1979 claim of discovery and occupation is fairly recent,
as compared to China, Taiwan, and Vietnam's claims, and is
challenged by several countries." Lastly, other countries control
105. See Liu, supra note 36, at 873 (stating that Malaysia's claim relies upon the
continental shelf provisions of UNCLOS); Cordner, supra note 40, at 67
(describing Malaysia's belief that the continental shelf provisions of UNCLOS and
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf support its sovereignty
claim over all features located on its continental shelf).
106. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 37 (stating that discovery and
occupation form the second basis for Malaysia's claim); Cordner, supra note 40, at
67 (observing that Malaysia's historical claim "coincide[d] with the issuing of the
Malaysian Map of 1979"); Dubner, supra note 30, at 313 (stating that the 1979
map declared sovereignty over all features on the Malaysian continental shelf).
107. See, e.g., Cordner, supra note 40, at 67 (referring to Malaysia's
interpretation of Article 76 as an "inverse application"); Liu, supra note 36, at 873
(describing the basis of Malaysia's claim as a "misinterpretation" of UNCLOS).
108. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, art. 77 (providing "[t]he coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it
and exploiting its natural resources").
109. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, art. 76 (defining the continental shelf of a
coastal State as "the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin"); Cordner, supra note 40, at 67 (noting that
UNCLOS continental shelf provisions do not refer to features "on the continental
shelf that rise above sea level"); KrITICHAISAREE, supra note 36, at 140
(concluding that UNCLOS does not cover territorial disputes). While the law of
the sea specifies the "effect of islands on the ocean regime, it does not, per se,
determine the legal status of islands." Id; see Jonathan I. Charney, Central East
Asia Maritime Boundaries and the Lav of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 729
(1995) (noting that rights in maritime zones do not form the basis for claiming new
territorial rights); PRESCOTr, supra note 90, at 222 (stating "[i]t is not waters
which give title to islands but islands which confer rights to waters").
110. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 37 (noting the weaknesses of
Malaysia's recently asserted and vigorously contested" historical claim).
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several of the features claimed by Malaysia."' However, Malaysia's
claim to the four features it has occupied since the 1980s may
possess more legal strength under the Palmas standard."2
6. Brunei
Brunei claims Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank, 13 both located in
the southern portion of the Spratly Islands, based on the belief that
these features are located on an extension of its continental shelf.'1
In support of this claim, Brunei relies on Articles 76 and 77 of
UNCLOS" 5 and a 1954 British decree establishing Brunei's
maritime boundaries. 16 Unlike the other countries, Brunei does not
111. See Dubner, supra note 30, at 314-16 (listing claims made by other
countries which overlap Malaysia's claim). Vietnam also claims and protests
Malaysia's claim to Amboyna Cay. See id. The Philippines claims and protests
Malaysia's claim to Commodore Reef. See id. Brunei claims and protests
Malaysia's claim to Louisa Reef. See id.; see also VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4,
at 37 (stating that Malaysia does not effectively control all of the features that it
claims); KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 36, at 144 (noting that Amboyna Cay is also
claimed by China, Vietnam, and the Philippines). Vietnam has occupied Amboyna
Cay since 1978. See id.
112. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 37 (describing Malaysian occupied
features). Malaysia has occupied Swallow Reef since 1983, Ardasier Reef and
Mariveles Reef since 1986, and Dallas Reef since 1987. See id. Louisa Reef and
Royal Charlotte Reef are "occupied" by a navigation light and beacon,
respectively. See id.; PRESCOTT, supra note 90, at 222 (stating that Malaysia
constructed obelisks on both Louisa and Commodore Reef); Murphy, supra note
1, at 207-08 (noting that the reefs claimed by Malaysia-Swallow Reef, Ardasier
Reef, and Mariveles Reef-have never been occupied by any of the other claimant
countries). Malaysia has peacefully and continuously occupied these features since
1983. See id.; see also VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 36 (stating that Malaysia
has also constructed an airstrip and "chalet" on Swallow Reef).
113. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (stating that Brunei published its
claim to Rifleman Bank in 1988 with the issuance of a map). The 1988 map
depicted Brunei's continental shelf extending beyond Rifleman Bank. See id.
114. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 69 (stating that Brunei claims Louisa Reef
and recently claimed Rifleman Bank); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 38
(stating that Brunei claims two reefs: Louisa Reef and Rifleman Bank); Liu, supra
note 36, at 873 (stating that Brunei's claim is based on geographic proximity). But
see Murphy, supra note 1, at 68 (stating that Brunei only claims Louisa Reef).
115. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 68 (noting that the continental shelf
provisions of UNCLOS form the basis of Brunei's claim).
116. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 68 (citing the 1954 British decree as the
basis for Brunei's claim). This decree delimited Brunei's maritime boundaries,
which included the continental shelf. See id.; see also VALENCIA ET AL., supra note
4, at 38 (quoting the decree that establishes Brunei's boundary and includes "the
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currently occupy any of the Spratly features." 7
Brunei's claim to Rifleman Bank appears to be based on a 350
nautical mile continental shelf claim"8 and is inconsistent with
UNCLOS because the East Palawan Trough" 9 separates Rifleman
Bank from Brunei and terminates the natural prolongation of
Brunei's continental shelf.12 If Louisa Reef is located on Brunei's
continental shelf, Brunei may have a valid claim under UNCLOS to
explore and exploit its resources since it is a submarine feature.''
Malaysia, however, also claims and occupies Louisa Reef."
C. EVALUATION OF CLAIMS
Under international law, each of the claimant countries'
sovereignty claims is weak." The evidence presented by China,
Taiwan, and Vietnam, in support of their historical claims, is
unconvincing and sparse-it merely illustrates the countries'
intermittent contact and brief occupation of the islands.' 4 Likewise,
the claims of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei suffer from
area of the continental shelf... territorial waters").
117. See Liu, supra note 36, at 873.
118. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 68 (stating that the basis for Brunei's claim
of Rifleman Bank is uncertain, but appears to be a 350 nautical mile continental
shelf claim); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (commenting that Brunei's
claim to Rifleman Bank is either based upon a 350 nautical mile continental shelf
claim or its claim to Louisa Reef).
119. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 68 (stating that the East Palawan Trough is
located 60 to 100 miles off Brunei).
120. See UNCLOS, supra note 34, art. 76 (defining the continental shelf).
121. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 208 (stating that Louisa Reef is not an island
since it does not have any permanent dry land). Since Louisa Reef is "essentially
part of the seabed," Brunei may exclusively exploit the reef's resources. Id; see
VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (noting that only two small rocks remain
above water at high tide).
122. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 36, 38 (noting that Malaysia also
claims Louisa Reef). Malaysia "occupies" Louisa Reef with a navigation light and
an "accommodation module." Id at 36; see Liu, supra note 36, at 873 (stating that
Brunei does not occupy any of the features it claims).
123. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 39 (concluding that all claims
asserted by the countries are weak). But see Belier, supra note 46, at 310
(concluding that an analysis under international law favors China's claim).
124. See Cordner, supra note 40, at 68-69 (noting that the historical claims of
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam are unconvincing and incapable of demonstrating any
effective control giving rise to territorial sovereignty).
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factual weaknesses and legal misinterpretations. 2 ' Although some of
these claims may be sufficient to satisfy the Clipperton standard,'26
recent cases indicate that evidence of actual possession and use are
emphasized more than evidence of discovery.'27
With the exception of Brunei, each of the countries has made
attempts to occupy the islands.128 Taiwan, for example, has
continuously occupied Itu Aba since 1956,129 and Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, and China have each controlled several
features since 1973, 1978, 1983, and 1988, respectively. 30 These
occupations most likely satisfy the Palmas standard of a continuous
display of authority.'31 Other claimant countries, however, have
protested and not acquiesced to these sovereign displays.'32
In an attempt to resolve their differences, the countries have
resorted to bilateral negotiations, consultations, and informal regional
discussions."' These approaches have proved fruitless and little
125. See generally VALENCIA ETAL., supra note 4, at 33-38.
126. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Clipperton
Island case which held that evidence of occupation may not be necessary to
establish sovereignty over uninhabited territory).
127. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (summarizing the Minquiers
and Ecrehos case and the Case Concerning the Land, Island, and Maritime Frontier
Dispute, in which the International Court of Justice resolved conflicting
sovereignty claims based upon evidence of possession rather than historical claims
of discovery).
128. See supra notes 71-72, 77, 89, 103, 112 (describing the features each
country occupies).
129. See supra note 79 and accompanying text (describing Taiwan's occupation
of Itu Aba); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 39-40.
130. See VALENCIA ETAL., supra note 4, at 39-40.
131. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 209 (concluding that Taiwan's and Vietnam's
occupations have been long enough to establish sovereignty under the Palmas
Island standard).
132. See supra notes 98, 110-11, 122 and accompanying text (noting that other
countries contest the claims of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei); Bennett,
supra note 3, at 434 (noting that China claims all of the Spratlys and refuses to
recognize the claims of other countries).
133. See Cecille Yap, The Claim on Kalayaan Islands in Spratlys Group Bus.
WORLD (MANILA), Feb. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7200296 (describing
some of the negotiation strategies being used by the claimant countries);
Government to Hold Meeting on Spratlys, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS
CAPSULES, June 17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7724991 (stating that Taiwan's
Task Force on South China Sea Affairs will begin a new round of meetings to
discuss a five-point plan of action concerning the Spratly Islands). Taiwan's plan
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progress has been made.'34 Meanwhile, incidents of armed conflict
among the claimant countries have erupted. 3S Most notably, China
sank three Vietnamese supply ships in 1988, killing seventy-two
Vietnamese. 13 6 As tension and the threat of armed conflict continues
to build, countries are making efforts to increase the size and strength
of their military forces in the region. 37
The presently utilized negotiation strategies have achieved very
little, and international law does not provide much guidance in
resolving the dispute. The best course of action for all countries
involved would be to establish a joint development zone.1
3 8
includes the following: plans to safeguard the region, plans to develop and manage
the islands, efforts to increase cooperation among claimant countries, peaceful
methods for resolving the dispute, and plans to preserve the region's natural
ecology. See id; Chinese Seek to Reassure Manila on Spratlys, PERISCOPE-DAILY
DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, May 10, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7599253 (noting that
China's Deputy Military Chief and four generals visited Manila in an attempt to
calm fears of armed conflict over the Spratlys).
134. See VALENCIA, supra note 9, at 50-54 (stating that Indonesian sponsored
conferences have encouraged and facilitated discussion, but participants are still
unable to agree on fundamental matters). The Indonesian talks have "generated
more heat than light." Id at 52.
135. See supra note 93 (describing a 1971 incident in which a Philippine fishing
vessel was fired upon by Taiwan); see also Valencia, supra note 35 (noting that in
April 1988, Malaysia arrested several Filipino fishermen in an area claimed by
both Malalysia and the Philippines). In 1992 and 1994, the Philippines arrested
Chinese fishermen for fishing near islands claimed by the Philippines. See id.
136. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (describing the 1988 incident).
137. See Uli Schmetzer, Philippines Shopping for Warships, Jets, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, May 21, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2824316 (stating that the
Philippine government is buying warships and jets); Missile Boat Requirement
Profiled, PERISCOPE-DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, May 9, 1997, available in 1997
WL 7724309 (reporting that the Philippines is negotiating with the British Royal
Navy to purchase three missile boats equipped with anti-aircraft missiles and deck
guns to update its aging fleet); see also Nirmal Ghosh, Manila Steps Up Talks to
Buy Missile Boats, SING. STRArrS TMEs, May 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7210943 (stating that it is the Philippines' belief that recent incidents in the Spratly
Islands have necessitated the rapid modernization of its fleet); Asian Countries
Beef Up Naval Fleets, THE FILIPINO EXPRESS, Mar. 3, 1996, available in 1996 WL
15673215 (remarking that China, Vietnam, and the Philippines are in the process
of adding to their military fleet). In 1994, Vietnam added two 455-tonne corvettes
to its navy. See id China is attempting to purchase two attack submarines and an
aircraft carrier. See id. The Philippines is also seeking to purchase second hand
patrol boats and frigates. See id
138. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 60 (commenting that a joint
development authority, achieved by negotiation, would be a better result).
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III.THE TIMOR GAP TREATY AS A MODEL FOR
JOINT DEVELOPMENT
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE TIMOR GAP DISPUTE
A possible solution to the Spratly Islands dispute could be a joint
development agreement modeled after the Timor Gap Treaty. On
December 11, 1989, Australia and Indonesia entered into an
agreement establishing a provisional zone of cooperation for joint
development of seabed resources in the Timor Gap." 9 The resulting
Timor Gap Treaty resolved a seventeen-year dispute between
Australia and Indonesia over seabed boundary delimitation.'40
The Island of Timor encompasses approximately 25,000 square
meters and is located in the Indian Ocean approximately 300 miles
northwest of Australia.' West Timor, once part of the Dutch East
Indies, became part of the Indonesian Republic following World War
11.1412 The eastern portion of the island was a Portuguese colony until
late 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor and proceeded to
incorporate it into the Indonesian Republic.
4 3
139. Australia-Indonesia: Treaty on the Zone of Cooperation in an Area
Between the Indonesian Province of East Timor and Northern Austl., Dec. 11,
1989, Austl.-Indon., 29 I.L.M. 475 [hereinafter Timor Gap Treaty]; see Stuart
Kaye, The Timor Gap Treaty: Creative Solutions and International Conflict, 16
SYDNEY L. REv. 72, 90 (1994) (stating that the Timor Gap Treaty entered into
force on February 9, 1991).
140. See James K. Kenny, Comment, Resolution III of the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Timor Gap Treaty, 2 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 131 (1993) (discussing the agreement regarding the joint use of petroleum
reserves).
141. See, e.g., R.D. Lumb, The Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in the
Timor Sea, 7 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 72 (1977); Ernst Willheim, Australia-
Indonesia Sea-Bed Boundary Negotiations: Proposals for a Joint Development
Zone in the "Timor Gap ", 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 821, 822 (stating that the
distance between East Timor and Australia is less than 400 nautical miles).
142. See Lumb, supra note 141, at 72 (providing an overview of the island's
history).
143. See Kenny, supra note 140, at 134-35 (stating that Indonesia invaded East
Timor on December 7, 1975). Both Portugal and the United Nations condemned
Indonesia's actions and recognized the right of the East Timorese to self-
determination. See id. at 134. Indonesia formally annexed East Timor on July 17,
1976. See id. at 135; see also Portugal Challenges Australia's Role in East Timor,
AsIAN POL. NEWS, Feb. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 2224471 (providing that
the United Nations considers East Timor to be under the administrative power of
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The Timor Gap, located in the Timor Sea between Eastern Timor
and northwest Australia,"' was created in 1972 after Australia and
Indonesia signed treaties establishing seabed boundaries in an area
east of Papua New Guinea' and an area south of West Timor."
Australia also attempted to negotiate and establish a seabed boundary
with Portugal, who controlled East Timor, but was ultimately
unsuccessful.' 47 Therefore, a gap resulted and remained in the seabed
boundary between Eastern Timor and Australia. In 1974, reports of
petroleum discoveries in the Kelp structure within the Timor Gap
region revealed the significant oil and gas production potential of the
region.141 As oil companies would not likely enter exploration
Portugal); Kaye, supra note 139, at 75 (noting that in 1978, Australia granted de
facto recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor, despite Australia's
initial "unenthusiastie" protest).
144. See Willheim, supra note 141, at 822 (explaining the boundary dispute).
145. See Agreement Between the Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain
Seabed Boundaries, May 18, 1971, Austl.-Indon., 1973 Austl. T.S. No. 31;
Willheim, supra note 141, at 822 (stating that the 1971 agreement established a
520 nautical mile boundary in the Arafura Sea, extending from "west of Cape
York to north of Arnhem Land").
146. See Agreement Between the Government of the Commonwealth of
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia Establishing Certain
Seabed Boundaries in the Area of the Timor and Arafura Seas, Supplementary to
the Agreement of May 18, 1971, Oct. 9, 1972, Austl.-Indon., 1973 Austl. T.S. No.
32; Willheim, supra note 141, at 822 (noting that the second treaty established a
540 nautical mile boundary). This Treaty extended the 1971 boundary westward in
two segments, terminating in an area south of West Timor. See id A 130 nautical
mile gap was created south of East Timor. See id
147. See Anthony Bergin, The Australian-Indonesian Timor Gap Maritime
Boundary Agreement, 5 INT'L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 383, 384 (1990)
(stating that Portugal preferred to wait until the 1972 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea concluded before entering into negotiations with Australia).
By the time UNCLOS concluded in 1982, however, Indonesia had already
annexed East Timor. See id
148. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 76 (stating that oil and gas discoveries were
first reported in 1974). These reports increased exploratory activity in the region
and served as a significant motivating factor in negotiations. See id; see also
William Martin & Dianne Pickersgill, Recent Development, The Timor Gap
Treaty-The Treaty Between Australia and the Republic of Indonesia on the Zone
of Cooperation in the Area Between the Indonesia Province of East Timor and
Northern Australia, Dec. 11, 1989, Australia-Indonesia, Reprinted in 29 LL.M
469 (1990), 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 566, 568 (1991) (estimating that the Kelp
structure contains between 500 million and five billion barrels of oil and gas
deposits); Eric Nelson, Australia's Reaction to the Violence in East Timor:
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contracts in disputed territory,'49 Australia and Indonesia began
negotiations in 1979 to establish a permanent boundary and close the
Timor Gap. 50
Australia claimed that the Timor Trough, a prominent submarine
trench located approximately 40 to 70 nautical miles from and
running parallel to the coast of Timor,' was a natural boundary and
represented the outer edge of the Australian continental shelf s
natural prolongation. 52 Indonesia, on the other hand, claimed that a
single continuous continental shelf separated Timor and Australia,
and therefore, a median line or equidistance method should be used
to delimit the boundary between the countries' opposite territorial sea
baselines. 53
With neither country willing to concede or compromise their
respective positions, Australian officials suggested that negotiations
center on a joint development zone. 54 Despite initial reluctance on
the part of Indonesia, Australia and Indonesia agreed in principle to
implement a joint development zone in October 1985.' Although
Economic Ties with Indonesia May be Keeping Government Quiet, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 2, 1991, at A8 (noting that oil reserves in the Timor Gap region are estimated
at one to six million barrels). The area is believed to be one of the world's 25
richest oil deposits. See id.
149. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 76 (noting that in order to exploit oil or gas
resources, there can be no uncertainty of seabed ownership).
150. See Lumb, supra note 141, at 74 (discussing the boundary claims of
Australia and Indonesia).
151. See Willheim, supra note 141, at 822 (noting that the Timor Trough is
approximately 3000 meters deep). The Trough, located 30 to 60 nautical miles off
of Timor's coast, is closer to Indonesia than it is to Australia. See id,
152. See id, (noting that the agreed boundary roughly follows the line of the
Timor Trough).
153. See Lumb, supra note 141, at 74 (discussing Australia's view as to which
principles of seabed delimitation should be applied).
154. See id, (discussing Indonesia's argument for seabed delimitation); see also
Kaye, supra note 139, at 78 (stating that Australian officials first suggested the
concept of a joint development zone in 1984).
155. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 78 (noting that Australia's suggestion of a
joint development zone "received a cool reception" from Indonesia); Bergin, supra
note 147, at 384 (noting that the discovery of petroleum in the seabed increased
interest in reaching a settlement); Martin & Pickersgill, supra note 148, at 568
(discussing oil as an impetus for agreement). But see Kenny, supra note 140, at
136-37 (stating that in May 1979, Indonesia was the first to suggest a joint
development zone).
13:727
THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DIsPUTE
relations between the two countries deteriorated in 1986 and slowed
negotiations, 5 6 an agreement was finally reached in 1988."7 On
December 11, 1989, the Foreign Ministers of Australia and Indonesia
signed the Timor Gap Treaty while flying over the newly created
Zone of Cooperation in the Timor Sea.'58
B. THE TIMOR GAP TREATY
The Timor Gap Treaty is a long and complex document."9 The
primary purpose of the treaty is to establish a Zone of Cooperation in
the Timor Gap for the joint exploration and exploitation of natural
resources. 6 The treaty covers an area of approximately 60,000
square kilometers and divides the Timor Gap into three areas, labeled
A, B, and C.' 6 The treaty will remain in force for at least forty years,
or until a permanent boundary is agreed upon.'62
The boundaries of each of these three areas reflect the maximum
possible extent of the countries' claims.'63 The northernmost
boundary of the Zone of Cooperation reflects the maximum extent of
156. See Bergin, supra note 147, at 384 (stating that a visit by Australia's
Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, to Indonesia accelerated progress in the
negotiations).
157. See id at 384-85.
158. See, e.g., Indonesia, Australia Sign Timor Gas Pact, PLATT'S OILGRAM
NEWS, Dec. 13, 1989, available in 1989 WL 2122297 (stating that Indonesia's
Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, and Australia's Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans,
signed the treaty in an Australian airplane, while flying over the Timor Gap).
159. See Bergin, supra note 147, at 385 (noting that the Timor Gap Treaty
encompasses 129 pages and consists of 34 articles and four annexes).
160. See id (stating that the sole purpose of the Zone of Cooperation created by
the treaty is petroleum exploitation and exploration).
161. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 2(1), 29 I.L.M. at 477
(describing the territorial scope of the treaty).
162. See id pt. VIII, art. 33, 29 I.L.M. at 492 (providing that unless the two
countries are able to agree on a permanent delimitation, the Treaty will continue in
force for successive 20 year terms following the initial 40 year term); Richard
Woolcott, Australia-Republic of Indonesia Seabed Boundaries Now Settled,
JAKARTA POST, Mar. 27, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10016526 (noting that the
Timor Gap Treaty is provisional and will be up for review in the year 2031);
Bergin, supra note 147, at 385 (discussing the scope of the Timor Gap Treaty).
163. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 79 (stating that the Zone of Cooperation
"represents the extremes that both States could claim, and all that lies in between
them").
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Australia's continental shelf claim,I" while the southern most
boundary reflects the maximum possible extent of Indonesia's 200
nautical mile EEZ claim. 6 Simplified equidistance lines form the
eastern and western boundaries.'66 The claims of Australia and
Indonesia are also reflected in the boundaries within the Zone of
Cooperation. 6 7 The boundary separating Area C, in the north of the
Zone, from Area A, the central area of joint development, represents
the 1500 meter isobath.68 The boundary separating Area A and Area
B, in the south of the Zone, represents the median line between the
two countries."'
Area B, located in the southern most part of the Zone of
Cooperation, is subject to the sole jurisdiction of Australia.
7
1
Australia must notify Indonesia of any petroleum operations' and
share sixteen percent of the tax revenue generated from petroleum in
the area.77 Area C, in the northernmost portion of the Zone, is under
Indonesian jurisdiction.'7 Indonesia must also notify Australia of any
petroleum operations in Area C74 and must share ten percent of the
164. See, e.g., Bergin, supra note 147, at 385 (stating that the northern boundary
of the Zone of Cooperation roughly represents the axis of the Timor Trough). This
boundary represents the furthest extent of Australia's claim. See Kaye, supra note
139, at 79.
165. See, e.g., Martin & Pickersgill, supra note 148, at 569 (providing that the
southern boundary represents the edge of a 200 nautical mile EEZ, measured from
the Timor Coast).
166. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 139, at 79 (stating that the western and eastern
edges of the Zone of Cooperation represent simplified lines of equidistance); see
also Bergin, supra note 147, at 385 (noting that the shape of the Zone of
Cooperation has been described as a "coffin-shaped box").
167. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 79 (noting that the treaty "represents the
extremes that both States could claim").
168. See id. (stating that the line separating Zones C and A approximate the
1500 meter isobath). Australia claimed that the Timor Trough was a natural
boundary. See id. at 73.
169. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 79 (noting that a simplified median line
between East Timor and Australia divides areas A and B). Indonesia claimed that a
median line between the two countries should serve as the boundary. See Bergin,
supra note 147, at 383.
170. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 4(1).
171. See id. art. 4(1)(a).
172. See id. art. 4(1)(b).
173. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 80 (stating that Indonesia has complete civil
and criminal jurisdiction in Area C).
174. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 4(2)(a).
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petroleum tax revenue generated in the Area. 75 Area A, located in
the central portion of the Zone, represents the overlapping territorial
claims of Australia and Indonesia and is the area subject to joint
control.1 6 The proceeds generated from petroleum exploitation in
Area A are shared equally by Australia and Indonesia.'
1. Major Provisions of the Timor Gap Treaty
In addition to defining the areas governed, the Treaty provides for
the creation of a Ministerial Council and a Joint Authority to oversee
the various rights and responsibilities involved in petroleum
exploration and exploitation in Area A.' The Council is composed
of an equal number of Ministers appointed from each country.'79 The
Ministerial Council meets alternately in Australia or Indonesia once a
year or as often as necessary."' All Ministerial Council decisions are
made by consensus.' In addition to overseeing the Joint
Authority,' the Ministerial Council has the responsibility for
making major decisions and overseeing all activities in Area A.'8
The Joint Authority consists of an equal number of Executive
Directors from each country, appointed by the Ministerial Council."
All decisions by the Joint Authority are made by consensus." The
175. See id art. 4(2)(b); Kaye, supra note 139, at 80 (accounting for the
disparity in tax revenue percentages that must be paid by Australia and Indonesia).
Kaye identifies three possible explanations for the disparity. First, the allocation of
a larger share of tax revenue to Indonesia was possibly meant as an inducement
since Indonesia was less than enthusiastic about Australia's joint development
suggestion. Second, the size and oil production potential of Australia's Area B is
much larger than Indonesia's Area C. Third, the larger percentage of tax revenue
allocated to Indonesia may represent Australia's "tacit recognition" of the strength
of Indonesia's claim. See id
176. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 2(2)(a).
177. See id art. 2(2)(a).
178. See id art. 5(1) (creating the Ministerial Council) & art 7(1) (creating the
Joint Authority).
179. See id art. 5(2).
180. See id art. 5(3) & art. 5(4).
181. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 5(5).
182. See id art. 7(3).
183. See id art. 6 (designating the functions of the Ministerial Council).
184. See id art. 9(1)(a).
185. See id art. 7(4). If consensus cannot be reached, the matter is submitted to
the Ministerial Council. See id
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Joint Authority is responsible for managing petroleum exploration
and exploitation activities in Area A." 6 The Joint Authority's other
functions include the awarding of Petroleum Sharing Contracts, the
division of Area A into contract blocks, and the collection and
distribution of proceeds from Production Sharing Contracts."8 7
The Treaty also provides a detailed Petroleum Mining Code. 8 and
a Model Production Sharing Contract.8 9 The Petroleum Mining Code
sets forth the obligations and rights of the Joint Authority and
petroleum contractors. 9 Under the Petroleum Mining Code,
contractors have the right to explore and extract oil while the Joint
Authority retains ownership of all petroleum extracted until it is
loaded onto tankers.' 91 The petroleum is shared by the Joint
Authority and contractor according to a formula set forth in the
Model Production Sharing Contract. 92 The Model Production
Sharing Contract forms the basis for all contracts entered into
between the Joint Authority and contractors. 93 In addition to
containing a production sharing formula, the Model Production
Sharing Contract provides for the relinquishment of petroleum
blocks if oil discoveries are not made within specified time frames.'94
C. EFFECTS OF THE TIMOR GAP TREATY
In addition to resolving a protracted territorial dispute, the Treaty
has served to strengthen previously strained relations between
Australia and Indonesia.'9 Commentators have referred to the Timor
186. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, art. 8.
187. See id. (listing the functions of the Joint Authority).
188. Id. annex B.
189. Id. annex C.
190. See id. annex B, art. 4 (setting forth the rights and duties of the Joint
Authority and contractors).
191. See Timor Gap Treaty, supra note 139, annex B, arts. 4(3) & 4(4).
192. See id. annex C, § 7.
193. See id. annex B, art. 5.
194. See id. annex C, § 3; see also Kaye, supra note 139, at 89 (commenting
that the relinquishment provision encourages the efficient development of Area A).
195. See Martin & Pickersgill, supra note 148, at 566 (characterizing the Treaty
as a "substantial step forward in the relations between the two countries"); Kaye,
supra note 139, at 96 (noting that prior to signing the Treaty, Australia and
Indonesia were at an impasse and would not budge from their "entrenched
positions").
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Gap Treaty as a "triumph of compromise"'96 and an "imaginative
approach to breaking the deadlock in boundary negotiations."'97 The
only perceived obstacles to the Treaty's success were two legal
actions challenging the Treaty's validity.'9 The first came in 1994
when three East Timorese activists sought to have the Treaty
nullified by the High Court of Australia.'" The second challenge
came in June 1995 when Portugal contested the Treaty's validity.""0
Both of these challenges, however, were struck down."'
196. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 95.
197. Bergin, supra note 147, at 391.
198. See Martin & Pickersgill, supra note 148, at 579 (stating that Portugal's
challenge to the Treaty's validity poses the greatest threat to the Treaty's success);
Kaye, supra note 139, at 95 (commenting, with regard to the Treaty's status, that
there are several "snakes in the garden").
199. See Horta and Others v. Australia. (1994) 181 C.L.R. 183; Kalinga
Senevirantne, Timor Gap Ruling Sets Back Resistance, INTER PRESS SERV., Aug.
19, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2578965 (reporting that three Timorese activists
claim that because the United Nations does not recognize Indonesia's annexation
of East Timor, Australia's treaty with Indonesia is illegal); Challenge in Australia
to Timor Deal with Jakarta, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 16, 1994, at 4,
available in 1994 WL 2223881 (stating that the Timorese contend Australia should
have signed the Treaty with East Timor instead of Indonesia).
200. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30)
(separate opinions of Judges Oda, Shahabuddeen, Ranjeva, and Vereshchetin)
(dissenting opinions of Judges Weeramantry and Skubiszewski). Portugal argued
that Australia, in signing the Timor Gap Treaty, "infringed the rights of the people
of East Timor to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over its natural
resources [and] infringed [on] the rights of Portugal as the administering
Power.. ." Id at 98.
201. See Horta and Others v. Australia, (1994) 181 C.L.R. 183 (holding that
regardless of the Treaty's validity, it was within the Parliament's constitutional
power to enact the Treaty's supporting legislation, which was valid); Case
Concerning East Timor ( Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30). The I.C.J., by a
14-2 majority, rejected Portugal's claim. The Court held that it did not have the
jurisdiction to assess Portugal's claims since it would be required to rule on the
legality of Indonesia's 1976 annexation of East Timor, in the absence of
Indonesia's consent. See id at 105; see also Court Rejects Portugal Stance on
Timor, THE IRISH TIMES, July 1, 1995, at 11, available in 1995 WI 14689583
(quoting the Presiding Judge of the International Court of Justice, Mohammed
Bedjaoui, as acknowledging that the Court can only exercise jurisdiction over a
state with its consent); Christine Forster, Portugal Loses in Tr' for Timor's Oil
Indonesia and Australia Still in Control, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, July 10, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 8136148 (stating that the Court could not rule on
Indonesia's conduct since it did not recognize the Court and was not a party to the
suit).
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Since the signing of the Treaty, numerous production sharing
contracts have been approved, oil wells have been drilled, seismic
surveys have been conducted, and several major oil discoveries have
been made." 2 Since the Treaty has successfully served its primary
purpose and the settlement of a permanent boundary in the near
future is unlikely, the Timor Gap Treaty is expected to continue in
effect until a more permanent solution is found.20 3
D. APPLICABILITY TO THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE
The Timor Gap Treaty is one example of a successful joint
development agreement,2 in which two countries have been able to
peacefully settle a potentially volatile dispute over precious natural
resources.2"' Important differences exist between the Spratly Islands
202. See Oil Exploration Contracts Approved for Timor Sea, THE ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 12, 1991, available in 1991 WL 6219058 (stating that as of 1991,
eleven petroleum exploration contracts, involving fifty-five oil companies, had
been approved). Forty-five oil wells are planned between 1991 and 1997. See id;
Exploratory Oil Drillings in East Timor Gap to Begin Soon, INDON. INV.
HIGHLIGHTS, July 1, 1992, available in 1992 WL 2730419 (reporting that at least
six large oil companies are expected to invest approximately $450 million in
exploration activities over a six year period); Kalinga Seneviratne, Australia-East
Timor: Find Raises Stakes in Court Battle, INTER PRESS SERV., Oct. 24, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 2723018 (announcing a major oil discovery by Woodside
Petroleum in the Timor Gap). The discovery is estimated to be between 100 and
300 million barrels. See id. Nine of the world's largest oil companies have invested
over $250 million in oil exploration activities in the Timor Gap. See id. They have
contracted to drill twenty-three wells by 1995 and an additional twenty-two wells
by 1997. See id.; see also Aussie Operators Chalk Up More Offshore Strikes, THE
OIL & GAS J., Jan. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7943048 (announcing gas
discoveries made by West Australia Petroleum and BHP Petroleum in the Timor
Gap). But see Australia Benefiting More than Indonesia from Timor Gap, ASIA
PULSE, Mar. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10648503 (reporting that Australia is
receiving greater benefits than Indonesia). More Australian workers are employed
in the Timor Gap and approximately eighty-nine percent of production sharing
contracts are being awarded to Australia. See id.
203. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 96 (stating that as long as oil exists in the
Timor Gap, there is little hope for establishing a permanent boundary).
204. See generally Willheim, supra note 141, at 832-34 (describing existing
models for joint development, including the agreements between Thailand and
Malaysia and Korea and Japan); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 183-85 (listing
12 other joint development precedents); Bergin, supra note 147, at 390 (stating
that joint development agreements are common "[w]here mineral and hydrocarbon
wealth straddles the continental shelf boundary between coastal states").
205. See Kaye, supra note 139, at 95 (stating that the Timor Gap Treaty avoided
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dispute and the Timor Gap dispute. The Timor Gap dispute involved
two countries with opposite coastlines and concerned the
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries." 6 The dispute did not
involve any islands and each country based its claim upon "bona fide
legal principles."2 7 In addition, there were no incidents of armed
conflict, and regional security concerns did not influence the
outcome of the dispute.208 In contrast, the Spratly Islands dispute
concerns the sovereignty claims of six countries who each claim all
or part of a collection of tiny islands and submerged features.2"
Some of the countries base their claims on historical evidence of
discovery and occupation, while other countries rely on legal
arguments 2 1 1 Several incidents of armed conflict have occurred and
regional security issues are a key factor and concern in the dispute. 1
Despite significant differences in the factual backgrounds of the
two situations, the Timor Gap Treaty could nonetheless serve as a
workable model and source of ideas and principles for a solution to
the Spratly Islands dispute212 In order to achieve success, however,
any solution modeled after the Timor Gap Treaty will have to
account for these distinctions.
a major dispute caused by the potential value of the oil located in the region).
206. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 139, at 72 (noting that Australia and Indonesia
were unable to agree on how the boundary between their continental shelves
should be delimited).
207. See William T. Onorato & Mark J. Valencia, International Cooperation for
Petroleum Development. the Timor Gap Treaty, 5 ICSID REv. 1, 3 (1990); see
also Martin & Pickersgill, supra note 148, at 567 (commenting that international
maritime law curiously supported both countries' claims).
208. See Onorato & Valencia, supra note 207, at 3 (stating that Indonesia and
Australia were prime candidates for joint development).
209. See e.g., Cordner, supra note 40, at 62.
210. See generally, VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 20-38 (discussing the
bases of each countries' claim).
211. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (illustrating the strategic
importance of the Spratly Islands).
212. See Bruce Blanche & Jean Blanche, Oil and Regional Stability in the South
China Sea, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., Nov. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL
14357443 (stating that the Timor Gap Treaty could serve as a model for
negotiations).
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite recent incidents and mounting tension1 3 in the Spratly
Islands, the claimant countries involved in the dispute should
implement a joint development agreement, utilizing the principles
and structures employed in the Timor Gap Treaty. 14 Given the
claimant countries' recently expressed willingness to peacefully
resolve the dispute and explore joint development," 5 such a solution
213. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 21-22 (stating that seventy-two
Vietnamese were killed in 1988 during a battle with China over Fiery Cross Reef).
In 1994, The Philippines arrested fifty-five Chinese fisherman after they attempted
to build structures on a Philippine claimed feature. In 1995, China arrested and
detained thirty-five Filipino fisherman. See id. at 79-80; Nguyen Phan Phuong, Oil
Search Fuels Rising Tension in South China Sea, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 21,
1997, available in 1997 WL 7074351 (announcing Vietnam's formal protest to
China over a Chinese oil rig that began drilling in Vietnamese waters near the
disputed Spratlys); Vietnam Warned on Spratlys Oil Concessions, PERISCOPE-
DAILY DEF. NEWS CAPSULES, Apr. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 7598678
(reporting China's disapproval over oil exploration concessions granted by
Vietnam to CONOCO in the vicinity of the Spratlys); China Steps Up Forces in
Disputed Spratly Reef AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr. 30, 1997, available in 1997 WL
2104886 (announcing that China deployed three frigates to a reef claimed by the
Philippines); Philippines Sends Fighter Jets to Spratlys, AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, Apr.
30, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2105854 (stating that Philippine fighter jets are
patrolling the Spratlys in response to armed Chinese vessels seen approaching
Philippine claimed territory); Ma. Christina V. Deocadiz, Military to Drive Away,
But Won't Detain Chinese Vessels, BUS. WORLD (MANILA), June 26, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 11538633 (reporting that Philippine naval vessels fired
warming shots to drive away Chinese fishing boats seen near three islands claimed
by the Philippines).
214. See supra pt. III.B.1 (describing the roles and functions of the Ministerial
Council, Joint Authority, Petroleum Mining Code, and Model Production Sharing
Contract, as provided for in the Timor Gap Treaty).
215. See Chinese General Urges Joint Development of Isles, supra note 5
(noting China's suggestion that the claimant countries shelve their disputes and
develop jointly); China, Philippines Vow to Settle Spratlys Issue Peacefully,
AGENCE FR.-PRESSE, June 6, 1996, available in 1996 WL 3866261 (reporting that
China's foreign minister promised the Philippines' foreign minister that the Spratly
sovereignty issue would be settled peacefully); China Eyes Spratly Solution, THE
OIL DAILY, Apr. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8318559 (noting that China, in
an attempt to reduce regional tension, has suggested "shelving disputes and
accepting common development"); Cecille E. Yap, RP Okays China Plan on
Spratlys Resources, BUS. WORLD (MANILA), Feb. 25, 1997, available in 1997 WL
7200778 (reporting that the Philippines '"agrees in principle' with a Chinese
proposal to jointly develop the Spratlys"). Negotiations between China and the
Philippines, concerning joint development in the Spratlys, have been ongoing;
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would likely be well received.
Prior to establishing a joint development agreement, however, the
claimant countries must implement more confidence building
measures to foster a greater sense of cooperation." 6 The countries
should agree on and implement a multilateral code of conduct
providing for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, cooperation, and
the exercise of self-restraint."7 The code of conduct should also
contain specific provisions prohibiting the countries from claiming
new territory, building new structures, granting oil exploration
concession,2"' and expanding military forces in the disputed region." 9
In addition, the countries should agree on measures to gradually
achieve demilitarization of the region." If taken, these preliminary
measures would help increase the likelihood of creating and
implementing a successful joint development agreement."
however, China has declined to negotiate with any of the other claimant countries.
See id
216. See VALENCIA, supra note 9, at 62-63 (stating that half-measures "help
build the confidence necessary to move beyond the unstable status quo to an
interim solution that is both equitable and stable").
217. See id. (noting that a code of conduct is one example of a half-measure
intended to facilitate the negotiation process). The Philippines, China, and
Vietnam are already parties to bilateral codes of conduct in the Spratly Islands. See
id; Manila; Hanoi Agree on Code of Conduct in Spratlys, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSIlRE, Nov. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File
(announcing that the Philippines and Vietnam have agreed on a code of conduct in
the Spratly Islands). The Philippines also signed a similar code of conduct with
China. See id
218. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 210-11 (noting that a significant oil discovery
could tempt China to resort to the use of force).
219. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 120 (noting that a code of conduct
could also include measures designed to prevent accidental military encounters and
conflicts over fisheries).
220. See Yap, The Claim on Kalayaan Islands in Spralys Group, supra note
133. A Philippine government official announced that the Philippines proposes
demilitarization of the region before implementing any joint development
agreement and stewardship of the islands. See id
221. See VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 186-87. A successful joint
development agreement resolving the Spratly Islands dispute will necessarily
address the following key issues/factors: 1) boundaries of the area to be governed
by joint development, 2) the status of each country's sovereignty claim during the
period of joint development, 3) identification of participants, 4) Taiwan's role, 5)
the power relationship amongst the claimants, 6) identification of the resources to
be managed, 7) governing structure, 8) which law would apply, 9) fiscal
arrangements, and 10) the length of the agreement. See id
1998]
AM. U INT'LL. REV.
Given the complexity of the six countries' overlapping and
conflicting claims, a single joint development zone encompassing the
entire Spratly region would be extremely difficult to administer and
would likely be met with opposition from China.222 China has
indicated its preference to negotiate bilaterally, perhaps to gain an
advantage over smaller and weaker countries. 22 3 In any event, a joint
development agreement will not succeed without China's
cooperation.224 Therefore, instead of creating a single joint
development zone, the claimants should establish twelve separate
joint development zones for each area of overlapping claims.
Mark J. Valencia, a Senior Fellow with the Program on
International Economics and Politics at the East-West Center,
Honolulu, Hawaii, suggests subdividing the disputed region based
upon the countries' overlapping claims.225 This subdivision takes into
consideration the maximum extent of each country's claim,
regardless of its strength or validity, and superimposes the claims
atop one another, resulting in a patchwork of twelve zones. Based on
this subdivision, the claimant countries should enter into a
provisional joint development treaty establishing twelve separate
joint development zones. The purposes of such zones would be joint
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, with each
zone employing the organizational and decision making structures
utilized in the Timor Gap Treaty. In addition, the treaty should freeze
all sovereignty claims for the duration of the joint development
agreement.
For example, Brunei's claim, which extends out from its coast to
an area beyond Rifleman Bank, overlaps in five different areas with
the claims of China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Under a
joint development regime, these five areas of overlap would each be
222. See Murphy, supra note 1, at 210 (acknowledging that China prefers to
negotiate bilaterally); China Favours Bilateral Approach to Spratlys Issue, AsIA
PULSE, Jan. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10152295 (acknowledging that the
Chinese government prefers a bilateral approach to resolving the conflict over the
Spratly Islands). The Philippines has reiterated its preference for multilateral
arrangements. See id.
223. See Murphy, supra note I, at 209-10.
224. See id. at 210.
225. VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 217-18. Valencia's subdivision regards
the claims of Taiwan and China as one. See id.
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controlled by a joint development agreement, thereby resulting in
five joint development zones within the territory claimed by Brunei.
Separate detailed treaties would govern each joint development
zone. These treaties would contain a Mining Code and Model
Production Sharing Contract and provide for the establishment of a
Ministerial Council and Joint Authority. For further illustration,
consider the region encompassing Louisa Reef, within the area
claimed by Brunei. This region, which is also claimed by China and
Malaysia, would constitute one joint development zone. As
established by treaty, a Ministerial Council and a Joint Authority,
consisting of an equal number of representatives from Brunei, China,
and Malaysia would control this zone. As in the Timor Gap Treaty,
the Ministerial Council would meet annually, alternately in China,
Brunei, and Malaysia and have overall responsibility with regard to
the zone. Similarly, the Joint Authority's responsibilities would
include subdividing the zone into commercial blocks and entering
into contracts for petroleum exploration in these blocks. The Joint
Authority would make all decisions by consensus. Each member
would have equally weighted voting rights and the contractor, China,
Brunei, and Malaysia would share equally all process generated from
hydrocarbon exploitation.
The Spratly Islands joint development structure, however, would
deviate from the Timor Gap arrangement in one important aspect.
Unlike the Timor Gap agreement, which utilized a two-tiered
managerial structure" consisting of the Ministerial Council and
Joint Authority, the Spratly claimants would need to employ a third
tier, or Managerial Council, to oversee and coordinate the activities
of the twelve joint development zones. The Managerial Council
would contain one Counselor from each of the claimant countries and
its role and function would be analogous to that of the Ministerial
Council's in the joint development zones. 7
Scholars and commentators have proposed countless solutions and
suggestions to resolve the impasse in the South China Sea.228 Joint
226. See Onorato & Valencia, supra note 207, at 6.
227. See supra notes 181-83 (describing the duties and responsibilities of the
Ministerial Council, as set forth in the Timor Gap Treaty).
228. See, e.g., VALENCIA, supra note 9, at 50-67 (discussing several alternate
solutions, including outright allocation); VALENCIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 133-87
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development, however, is the most appealing and promising solution.
Since each country's claim would receive full consideration, each
country would share in the resources located in the entire area it
claims. Joint development would not prejudice or adversely affect
any of the countries' claims since all claims would be frozen for the
duration of the agreement. Furthermore, by employing the structures
found in the Timor Gap Treaty, each country would have an equal
voice in the decision making process, thereby equalizing the
countries' bargaining power.
CONCLUSION
The Spratly Islands dispute is an inordinately complicated
situation for which international law and UNCLOS fail to provide a
definitive answer. Any solution to the Spratly Islands dispute,
however, will take time. By employing a provisional joint
development agreement, the countries will at least be able to jointly
and equitably exploit the natural resources located in the region, until
a more permanent solution can be agreed upon.
(exploring various solutions, including a marine park and marine regionalism).
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